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It’s a Property Issue: The Proper Treatment of 
Contingent Fees Under the Federal Tax Code 
Karl L. Marschel∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Income Tax system has always generated a fair 
amount of animosity among its targets. Because of the system’s 
statutory nature, disgruntled taxpayers seeking judicial remedies 
based on principles of fairness and equity rarely succeed. 
Nevertheless, individuals continue to appeal on every imaginable 
basis for a deduction or exclusion from their gross income, usually by 
characterizing a particular source of income as one given special 
treatment in the Internal Revenue Code (the Code).  
This Note examines one of the most recent characterizations that 
has formed a split among the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals. 
When an attorney and client enter into a contingent fee contract, the 
client agrees to give the attorney a certain portion of his or her future 
settlement or award. The circuit split concerns whether the client 
must report such contingent fees as gross income. The argument 
against their inclusion in the client’s gross income is that contingent 
fees represent the attorney’s property interest in the suit, which the 
client transferred to the attorney through the contingent fee contract. 
On the other hand, if contingent fees are merely an alternative 
method of payment to the attorney, they are deemed to constitute 
gross income to the client.  
The first Court of Appeals case to deal with this issue was Cotnam 
v. Commissioner,1 decided in 1959. In Cotnam, the Fifth Circuit 
determined that under Alabama law an attorney’s interest in his 
contingent fee is a property interest in the suit itself rather than an 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2003, Washington University School of Law.  
 1. 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959). 
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alternative method of payment.2 The fee was therefore an assignment 
of future income by the client.3 Accordingly, the court ruled that the 
portion of the client’s award given to the attorneys was not taxable to 
her.4 Little else was decided on this issue until 1995, when the 
Federal Circuit dismissed the characterization relied upon in Cotnam 
and concluded that a contingent fee contract does not warrant special 
treatment under the Code.5 Since that decision, eight other circuits 
have decided similar cases, with some siding for the exclusion and 
others against it.6 
Part I of this Note discusses the tax treatment of settlements and 
awards under the Code, including deductions allowed for settlements 
and awards, and the attorney’s fees paid in reaching them. This 
section will also consider the role of the alternative minimum tax for 
individuals in this tax treatment. Part II outlines the leading cases 
concerning the characterization problem. Part III analyzes the 
theories laid out in the leading cases and attempts to reconcile them 
within the structure of the current tax code. Part IV includes some 
proposals as to the correct theory and suggests action that the courts, 
as well as Congress, can take to resolve this dispute while 
maintaining the integrity of the Code. 
I. APPLICABLE TAX LAW 
The proper characterization of contingent attorney’s fees is one 
facet of the more general issue of what income or items of income 
should be included in a taxpayer’s gross income. Section 61(a) of the 
Code7 states that “gross income” means “all income from whatever 
 
 2. Id. at 125 (Rives and Brown, JJ., concurring).  
 3. Id.  
 4. Id.  
 5. Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 6. Hukkanen-Campbell v. Commissioner, 274 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2001); Kenseth v. 
Commissioner, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001); Foster v. United States, 249 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 
2001); Young v. Commissioner, 240 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2001); Srivastava v. Commissioner, 220 
F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000); Benci-Woodward v. Commissioner, 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Coady v. Commissioner, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000); Davis v. Commissioner, 210 F.3d 1346 
(11th Cir. 2000); Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000); Alexander v. 
I.R.S., 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995); Baylin v. Commissioner, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995).  
 7. 26 U.S.C. § 61 (1994). 
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source derived.”8 The Code lists several items that are specifically 
included or excluded from gross income,9 but does not explicitly deal 
with contingent attorney’s fees.10 Absent a specific exclusion in the 
Code, courts have generally construed section 61(a) broadly to give 
full effect to Congress’ authority to tax income.11 The Supreme Court 
first exhibited this propensity in Glenshaw Glass Co. v. 
Commissioner,12 where the court ruled that two-thirds of treble and 
punitive damages should be included in gross income unless 
specifically excluded by the Code.13 The Court determined that 
absent a clear Congressional intent to exclude such damages, they are 
comprehended by the general term, “income.”14 
While Glenshaw Glass clearly ruled on the taxability of treble and 
punitive damages, the Code provides for the exclusion of certain 
other types of income from gross income.15 Of these exclusions, only 
one addresses income derived from damages, providing that income 
stemming from several categories of tort-like damages in section 
104(a)(2) are excludable from gross income.16 This section provides 
the statutory authority for the exclusion of damages received as 
compensation for “physical injuries” or “physical sickness.”17 While 
this provides some protection from taxation to the taxpayer receiving 
damages, courts tend to interpret these exclusions narrowly.18  
 
 8. Id. § 61(a). 
 9. See id. § 61(b). 
 10. See id. § 61(a). 
 11. See, e.g., Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940). 
 12. 348 U.S. 426 (1955). 
 13. Id. at 432-33. 
 14. Id. at 431. The Court also noted that “[h]ere we have instances of undeniable 
accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion. 
The mere fact that the payments were extracted from the wrongdoers as punishment for 
unlawful conduct cannot detract from their character as taxable income to the recipients.” Id. 
 15. See I.R.C. §§ 101-39 (1994). Examples of excludable income include interest 
payments; proceeds from life insurance contracts; money from gifts, inheritance, bequests, or 
devises; money received as compensation for physical injuries or sickness; and income from 
discharge of indebtedness. Id. 
 16. Id. § 104(a)(2). 
 17. The Code provides that gross income does not include “the amount of any damages 
(other than punitive damages) received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump 
sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness.” 
Id. 
 18. The Court determined that in order to define gross income as broadly as possible, one 
must interpret exclusions from gross income as narrowly as possible. United States v. 
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Exclusions are not the end of the story, however. Taxpayers have 
another tool at their disposal when computing tax liability: 
deductions. The Code provides two basic ways that a taxpayer can 
deduct monies paid for attorney’s fees and expenses. First, under 
section 162(a), the taxpayer may be able to deduct attorney’s fees and 
expenses as a trade or business expense.19 However, this deduction 
rarely applies to average individual taxpayers because they only 
occasionally sue in a business capacity.20 Further, even with the 
ability to utilize such deductions, the taxpayer would still have to deal 
with alternative minimum tax treatment as outlined below.21  
A second more common approach for the individual taxpayer is to 
treat attorney’s fees and expenses as expenses incurred for the 
production of income,22 which qualify for a miscellaneous itemized 
deduction under section 212.23 However, the use of a miscellaneous 
itemized deduction for litigation expenses causes several problems. 
 
Centennial Savings Bank, 499 U.S. 573, 583 (1991). Further, the Code’s exclusion in section 
§ 104(a)(2) itself explicitly excludes punitive damages from its sweep. The addition of 
“physical” as a qualifier to personal injuries and sickness further limits this exclusion. I.R.C. 
§ 104(a)(2) (1994). This makes damages recovered for emotional distress taxable to the extent 
that they exceed the amount spent on medical treatment. However, none of the Code’s 
exclusion sections deal with contingent attorney’s fees. 
 Other examples of the Supreme Court’s limiting of the breadth of the Code’s exclusions 
include Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995) (ruling that damages received under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act are taxable) and United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 
(1992) (ruling that settlements for back pay under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are 
not excluded).  
 19. Section 162(a) allows a deduction for “all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or 
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including- (1) a 
reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually 
rendered.” I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (1994). 
 20. The average individual taxpayer normally cannot meet the requirement that the 
expense is incurred “in carrying out any trade or business.” Id. 
 21. See infra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.  
 22. Section 212 allows the deduction of “all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or 
incurred during the taxable year- (1) for the production or collection of income; (2) for the 
management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income; or 
(3) in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax.” I.R.C. § 212 (1994). 
This Note focuses its attention upon the treatment of settlements and awards that would 
normally be subject to this deduction but for its exclusion under the AMT.  
 23. See id. § 67(b) (1994). The Code classifies “miscellaneous itemized deductions” as 
those other than listed in section 67(b). Section 63(d) defines “itemized deductions” as those 
“deductions allowable under this chapter other than- (1) the deductions allowable in arriving at 
adjusted gross income; and (2) the deduction for personal exemptions provided by section 151.” 
Id. § 63(d) (1994). 
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First, the Code only allows miscellaneous itemized deductions to the 
extent that they exceed two percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross 
income (AGI).24 Second, the Code imposes a staged reduction25 of 
itemized deductions for a taxpayer whose income exceeds 
$100,000.26 Finally, the most formidable obstacle in utilizing a 
miscellaneous itemized deduction is the alternative minimum tax 
(AMT).27 
Congress enacted the AMT in 1969 to ensure that high-income 
individuals do not avoid significant tax liability due to advantageous 
application of allowable deductions.28 The AMT consists of a 
separate system for calculating income tax liability.29 Under the 
AMT, taxpayers must first calculate their tax liability under the 
regular tax system and then determine whether their income requires 
further consideration under the AMT.30 If it does, the AMT expressly 
 
 24. Id. § 67(a) (1994). Adjusted gross income is calculated by subtracting deductions from 
one’s gross income. See id. § 62(a). 
 25. Id. § 68(a) (1994). This provision provides: 
 [I]n the case of an individual whose adjusted gross income exceeds the applicable 
amount, the amount of the itemized deductions otherwise allowable for the taxable 
year shall be reduced by the lesser of- (1) 3 percent of the excess of adjusted gross 
income over the applicable amount, or (2) 80 percent of the amount of the itemized 
deductions otherwise allowable for such taxable year. 
Id. 
 26. Id. § 68(b) (1994). Subsection (1) of this section defines the “applicable amount” in 
§ 68(a) as $100,000. This is then modified by subsection (2)(B), which provides that the 
applicable amount be adjusted by the cost-of-living adjustment for the applicable year. Id. § 68 
(1994). 
 27. Id. § 55 (1994). 
 28. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX: AN OVERVIEW OF ITS 
RATIONALE AND IMPACT ON INDIVIDUAL TAXPAYERS, No. GAO/CGD-00-180, at 3 (2000). 
The testimony heard by Congress when developing the AMT included that of the Secretary of 
the Treasury, who reported that 155 individuals, each with an AGI above $200,000 (about $1.1 
million in fiscal year 2000 dollars) as defined under the regular tax system, paid no federal 
income tax in 1967. JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 107TH CONG., THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM 
TAX FOR INDIVIDUALS: A GROWING BURDEN (Comm. Print 2001) (citing Hearings on the 1969 
Economic Report of the President Before the Joint Econ. Comm., 91st Cong. 10 (1969) 
(statement of Secretary of the Treasury Joseph Barr)). In addition, a report for Congress’ Joint 
Economic Committee stated that the purpose of enacting the AMT was “to reduce certain 
deductions used frequently by high-income taxpayers and infrequently by other taxpayers. 
Hence the AMT has provisions concerning deductions for drilling oil wells, farm tax shelters, 
interest from tax-exempt ‘private activity bonds,’ and other things unfamiliar to the average 
taxpayer.” Id.  
 29. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 28, at 4. 
 
 30. Id. 
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forbids the deduction of those expenditures classified as 
“miscellaneous itemized deductions.”31 Therefore, if a taxpayer’s 
award is large enough to be subject to the AMT, as is often the case 
when punitive damages are recovered, the taxpayer loses the benefit 
of the miscellaneous itemized deduction when calculating tax 
liability.32 Thus, for taxpayers with large awards and large attorney’s 
fees, the miscellaneous itemized deduction does not apply.  
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) generally requires taxpayers 
to characterize their entire award, including all parts allocated to their 
attorneys via a contingent fee arrangement, as gross income, and then 
deduct the fees and expenses as miscellaneous itemized deductions.33 
Often this would subject the entire amount of the award to the 
AMT.34 Thus, the current tax structure, when coupled with the 
compensation arrangements found in contingent fee contracts, 
generally creates an enormous tax burden upon the remainder of any 
settlement or award granted to the client.35 
II. THE CASELAW 
A. Cotnam v. Commissioner 
In Cotnam v. Commissioner,36 the Fifth Circuit grappled with the 
issue of whether the fees paid to the client’s attorneys by way of a 
contingent fee contract should be considered gross income.37 The 
 
 31. I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (1994). 
 32. Benci-Woodward v. C.I.S., 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 33. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-09-053 (Dec. 2, 1997). 
 34. The result of this would be to require the taxpayer to subject his award to either a 26% 
or 28% tax. See I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(A)(i) (1994). 
 35. As an illustration, take an individual who receives an award of $500,000 for back pay 
and who has a contingent fee contract with an attorney that awards the attorney forty percent of 
the final award. In this situation, the client only receives $300,000 after compensating his 
attorney. Further, the individual must pay either approximately $200,000 in federal income tax 
(if one assumes standard tax treatment) or approximately $150,000 (assuming treatment under 
the AMT at 28%). This leaves the client with only $150,000 to $100,000. When coupled with 
additional fees (court costs, etc.), as well as state income tax, the client is left with only a small 
portion of his or her original award. 
 36. 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959). 
 37. Cotnam also involved a question of the taxability of a devise as payment for services 
rendered. Id. at 121. 
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then Fifth Circuit38 characterized contingent fees in two ways. First, 
because the court concluded that the client could never have received 
the portion of the award assigned to the attorneys,39 under Alabama 
law,40 “attorneys have the same rights as their clients” to that portion 
of the proceeds of the client’s action that are assigned to the attorneys 
via a contingent fee contract.41  
Second, the court noted that the client’s claim had no value 
without the benefit of her attorneys.42 Thus, when she entered into a 
contract assigning forty percent of her case to her attorneys, it was 
not an assignment of income as governed by Lucas v. Earl,43 but 
 
 38. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 41; Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th 
Cir. 1981). In 1981, the former Fifth Circuit was divided into two separate circuits, the Fifth, 
consisting of Texas, Mississippi and Louisiana, and the Eleventh, consisting of Florida, Georgia 
and Alabama. Both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits consider Fifth Circuit decisions issued prior 
to the 1981 division as precedent.  
 39. The court stated, “[u]nder Alabama law, therefore, Mrs. Cotnam could never have 
received the $50,365.83, even if she had settled the case directly with the Bank.” Id. 
 40. The court states:  
Upon suits, judgments, and decrees for money, [attorneys] shall have a lien superior to 
all liens but tax liens, and no person shall be at liberty to satisfy said suit, judgment or 
decree, until the lien or claim of the attorney for his fees is fully satisfied; and 
attorneys at law shall have the same right and power over said suits, judgments and 
decrees, to enforce their liens, as their clients had or may have for the amount due 
thereon to them. 
263 F.2d at 125 n.5 (quoting ALA. CODE § 64(2) (1940)). 
 41. Id. at 125. 
 42. “[Mrs. Cotnam’s] claim had no fair market value, and it was doubtful and uncertain as 
to whether it had any value . . . [it] was worthless without the aid of skillful attorneys.” Id.  
 43. 281 U.S. 111 (1930). Earl provides the main basis for the assignment of income 
doctrine. In this case, Mr. Earl and his wife entered into a contractual arrangement by which  
any property either of us now has or may hereafter acquire . . . in any way, either by 
earnings (including salaries, fees, etc.), or any rights by contract or otherwise during 
the existence of our marriage, or which we or either of us may receive by gift, bequest, 
devise, or inheritance, . . . and all such property shall be treated and considered, and 
hereby is declared to be received, held, taken, and owned by us as joint tenants, and 
not otherwise, with the right of survivorship.  
Id. at 113-14. In effect, this arrangement assigns half of Mr. Earl’s income to his wife. 
Therefore, if filing separately, the Earls would be able to avoid taxation at a higher rate. The 
Court dismissed this view of the contract and stated:  
There is no doubt the statute [the Revenue Act of 1921 42 Stat. 227, 233, 213(a)] could 
tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by 
anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised to prevent the 
salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it. That seems 
to us the import of the statute before us and we think that no distinction can be taken 
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rather an assignment of valueless property to the attorneys.44 The 
client therefore did not realize her attorneys’ portion of the award.45 
After the Cotnam decision in 1959, little was decided by the other 
circuits regarding taxation of the contingent fees until 1995. Since 
then, the Federal,46 First,47 Fourth,48 Fifth,49 Sixth,50 Seventh,51 
Ninth,52 Tenth,53 and Eleventh54 Circuits have each handed down 
 
according to the motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed 
to a different tree from that on which they grew.  
Id. at 114-15. 
 44. Under this treatment, the client transfers a portion of his claim to the attorney when 
they sign the contingent fee contract. Because the claim has no real value at this time, the client 
passes a valueless portion to his attorney. Both the attorney and client take their portion with no 
basis. 
 45. The court stated, “Mrs. Cotnam’s tree had borne no fruit and would have been barren 
if she had not transferred a part interest in that tree to her attorneys, who then rendered the 
services necessary to bring forth the fruit.” Id. at 126. 
 46. Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 47. The First Circuit touched upon this problem in Alexander v. I.R.S., 72 F.3d 938 (1st 
Cir. 1995). Alexander involved the tax treatment of the taxpayer’s settlement with his former 
employer regarding an age discrimination suit. Id. at 940. While the court did not enter into a 
full Cotnam-type discussion, it rejected a state law argument that could allow the taxpayer to 
avoid tax liability. Id. at 946. While not specifically on point, the court did seem to indicate that 
it would frown on a Cotnam-type decision. Id. 
 48. Young v. Commissioner, 240 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 49. Srivastava v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 50. Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 51. Kenseth v. Commissioner, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 52. The Ninth Circuit has issued two rulings dealing with whether an attorney’s 
contingent fee should be included within the clients’ income. In Coady v. Commissioner, 213 
F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit put forth its first opinion dealing with the question 
at hand. In Coady, the taxpayers urged the court to exclude from their gross income that portion 
of the settlement from Ms. Coady’s wrongful termination suit that was assigned to their 
attorney via a contingent fee contract. Id. at 1188. The court noted the split between the circuits 
in the treatment of such cases. Id. at 1189. The court then agreed with the Baylin line of 
decisions, distinguishing Cotnam and Clarks on the basis that under Alaska law, “attorneys do 
not have a superior lien or ownership interest in the cause of action as they do in Alabama and 
Michigan.” Id. at 1190. The Alaska law governing attorney’s liens provides:  
(a) An attorney has a lien for compensation, whether specially agreed upon or implied, 
as provided in this section . . . (4) fourth, upon a judgment to the extent of the costs 
included in the judgment or, if there is a special agreement, to the extent of the 
compensation specially agreed on, from the giving of notice of the lien to the party 
against whom the judgment is given and filing the original with the clerk where the 
judgment is entered and docketed.  
(b) This lien is, however, subordinate to the rights existing between the parties to the 
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decisions on the issue. 
 
Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 34.35.430). According to the court, this statute provides attorneys 
with a lien that “does not confer any ownership interest upon attorneys or grant attorneys any 
right and power over the suits, judgments, or decrees of their clients.” Id. The court concluded 
that the different type of lien found in Cotnam and Clarks made those cases distinguishable. Id. 
The Coady court was therefore unable to exclude the attorney’s fees from gross income. Id. at 
1191. 
 Shortly after deciding Coady, the Ninth Circuit considered Benci-Woodward v. 
Commissioner, 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000). In Benci-Woodward, a case arising out of 
California, the Court again sided with the Baylin line of decisions, using reasoning similar to 
that in Coady. Again, the court looked to the nature of the attorney’s lien in California. It 
determined that:  
[I]n whatever terms one characterizes an attorney’s lien under a contingent fee 
contract, it is no more than a security interest in the proceeds of the litigation . . . . 
While there is occasional language in cases in the effect that the attorney also becomes 
the equitable owner of a share of the client’s cause of action, we stated more 
accurately in Fifield Manor v. Finston (1960) 54 Cal.2d 632, 641, 7 Cal.Rptr. 377, 
383, 354 P.2d 1073, 1079, 78 A.L.R.2d 813, that contingent fee contracts “do not 
operate to transfer a part of the cause of action to the attorney but only give him a lien 
upon his client’s recovery. 
Id. at 943 (citing Isrin v. Superior Court, 403 P.2d 728, 732-33 (1965)). Without an attorney’s 
lien similar to either that in Cotnam or Clarks, the court again refused to exclude the attorney’s 
fees from the Benci-Woodward’s gross income. Id. at 943. Further, the court took a very 
negative view of this practice, noting:  
[T]he conclusion emerges that in litigation an attorney conducts for a client he acquires 
no more than a professional interest. To hold that a contingent fee contract or any 
“assignment” or “lien” created thereby gives the attorney the beneficial rights of a real 
party in interest, with the concomitant personal responsibility of financing the 
litigation, would be to demean his profession and distort the purpose of the various 
acceptable methods of securing his fee.  
Id. 
 53. Hukkanen-Campbell v. Commissioner, 274 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 54. The Eleventh Circuit has decided two cases in a manner similar to Cotnam, the most 
recent being Foster v. United States, 249 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2001). However, the Eleventh 
Circuit’s primary decision regarding this issue came in Davis v. Commissioner, 210 F.3d 1346 
(11th Cir. 2000). In Davis, the Eleventh Circuit held consistently with its own precedent from 
the former Fifth Circuit, established in Cotnam. Id. at 1347. Further, the court refused to apply 
the I.R.S.’s characterization, which would value the “property” given to the attorney at its value 
upon the case’s resolution, rather than its value at the time of transfer. Id. at 1348. 
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B. Baylin v. United States 
In Baylin v. United States,55 the Federal Circuit cast the first stone 
in opposition to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Cotnam. While the 
issue arose as a secondary point in the case,56 the court struck down 
the exclusion of an attorney’s contingent fee from the taxpayer’s 
income.57 Notably, the court found no reason to override section 
61(a) of the Code, which proclaims, “gross income means all income 
from whatever source derived.”58 The court also rejected the 
taxpayers’ argument that they could not have fully realized the 
income because they never received the money.59 Finally, the court 
noted that allowing a contingent fee exclusion would allow the 
taxpayer to “escape taxation . . . through a ‘skillfully devised’ fee 
 
 55. 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 56. The case primarily involved the deductibility of certain legal fees incurred by a 
partnership as capital expenditures. Id. at 1451. The question at hand only arose as an 
alternative argument to avoid taxation on the portion of attorney’s fees and expenses paid by 
contingent fee agreement. Id. at 1454. 
 57. Id. at 1454. 
 58. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 61(a) (1994)). The court also noted that the Supreme Court, in 
James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 219 (1961), “has given a liberal construction to the broad 
phraseology of the ‘gross income’ definition statutes in recognition of the intention of Congress 
to tax all gains except those specifically exempted.” Id. 
 59. The court states: 
Here, although the partnership did not take actual possession of the funds it paid to its 
attorney, opting instead to pay him directly out of its eventual recovery, it is evident 
that the partnership received the benefit of those funds in that the funds served to 
discharge the obligation of the partnership owing to the attorney as a result of the 
attorney’s efforts to increase the settlement amount. The fee arrangement signifies the 
value that the parties placed on the attorney’s services. In other words, the partnership 
“made such use or disposition of [its] power to receive . . . the income as to procure in 
its place other satisfactions which are of economic worth.” That the partnership 
assigned a portion of its condemnation recovery to its attorney before it knew the exact 
amount of the recovery does not mean that this amount never belonged to the 
partnership; it means simply that the attorney and client chose to estimate the value of 
the attorney’s services by tying the fee to the ultimate recovery and by having the state 
pay the attorney his fees directly from the recovery. The temporarily uncertain 
magnitude of the legal fees under such an arrangement and the vehicle of an 
assignment cannot dictate the income tax treatment of those fees. 
Id. at 1453-54 (citing Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940)). 
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arrangement.”60 According to the court, this was exactly the type of 
situation that the Supreme Court ruled against in Lucas v. Earl.61 
C. Estate of Clarks v. United States 
In Estate of Clarks v. United States,62 the Sixth Circuit followed 
the Fifth Circuit’s rationale63 while developing several alternative 
lines of reasoning to justify the exclusion of the attorney’s portion of 
a client’s award.64 
First, the court noted that Michigan common law accords 
attorneys rights under contingent fee contracts65 that are similar to the 
Alabama statutory rights discussed in Cotnam.66 Second, the court 
pointed to the Federal Circuit’s finding in Baylin, which held that the 
taxpayer received the benefit of his income.67 However, the Sixth 
 
 60. “Very little need be said about this argument, which, if accepted, would elevate form 
over substance and allow the partnership to escape taxation on a portion of its income through a 
‘skillfully devised’ fee arrangement.” Id. at 1454 (quoting Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115). 
 61. Id. at 1454. 
 62. 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 63. The court construed the questions as “a conflict in the Circuits on the issue of whether 
the interest portion of an attorney’s contingency fee should be included in the client’s income 
under Code § 61(a), even though the lawyer received and paid taxes on all of the money and the 
client received none of the money.” Id. at 856. 
 64. The court ultimately concluded that the portion awarded to one’s attorneys via a 
contingent fee contract should be excluded from the client’s gross income. Id. at 858. 
 65. The court relied on the following description of the common law lien: 
[T]he lien, as thus established, is not strictly like any other lien known to the law, 
because it may exist although the attorney has not and cannot, in any proper senses 
[sic], have possession of the judgment recovered. It is a peculiar lien . . . for the 
protection of attorneys against the knavery of their clients, by disabling clients from 
receiving the fruits of recoveries without paying for the valuable services by which the 
recoveries were obtained. 
Id. at 856 (quoting RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 116, at 559 
(2d ed. 1955)). 
 66. See supra notes 40-39 and accompanying text. The court noted that a previous district 
court case in Michigan had adopted the view that “the [contingent fee] agreement amounts to an 
assignment of a portion of the judgment sought to be recovered.” 202 F.3d at 856 (citing 
Dreiband v. Candler, 131 N.W. 129, 129 (1911)). The court further noted that “[a]lthough the 
underlying claim for personal injury was originally owned by the client, the client lost his right 
to receive payment for the lawyer’s portion of the judgment.” Id. Therefore, the reasoning in 
Cotnam concerning the attorney’s lien, supra note 39, applied in this case. 202 F.3d at 857. 
 67. “Baylin mentioned the Supreme Court’s liberal interpretation of ‘gross income’ and 
then found that although the plaintiff never had actual possession of the funds paid to the 
lawyer, plaintiff received the benefit of those funds in that they discharged an obligation of the 
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Circuit refused to follow this reasoning,68 instead observing that the 
taxpayer’s claim was valueless before the taxpayer sought the aid of 
an attorney and, therefore, could not be categorized as income 
already realized.69 
The court also observed that the Baylin decision relied on two 
Supreme Court cases, Lucas v. Earl70 and Helvering v. Horst.71 The 
Sixth Circuit distinguished these cases on the basis that they both 
dealt with a taxpayer who “earned and created the right to receive and 
enjoy the benefit of the income before any assignment.”72 The court 
 
plaintiff owed to the lawyer as a result of his work.” Id. at 856-57 (citing Baylin, 43 F.3d at 
1454). 
 68. The court views the Baylin court’s analysis of Lucas and Horst as essentially 
incorrect. Id. at 857. In the court’s view, the controlling factor in both cases was that “each 
taxpayer earned and created the right to receive and enjoy the benefit of the income before any 
assignment.” Id.  
 69. The court stated: 
In the instant case, as in Cotnam, the value of taxpayer’s lawsuit was entirely 
speculative and dependent on the services of counsel. The claim simply amounted to 
an intangible, contingent expectancy. The only economic benefit Clarks could derive 
from his claim against the defendant in state court was to use the contingent part of it 
to help him collect the remainder. 
Id. at 857.  
 70. 281 U.S. 111 (1930). See supra note 43. 
 71. 311 U.S. 112 (1940). In Horst, the taxpayer owned several negotiable bonds. He 
detached the interest coupons from these bonds shortly before their due date and gave them to 
his son, who subsequently turned them in for their cash value. 311 U.S. at 112. The Court 
grappled with the issue of whether the income derived from the interest coupons was taxable to 
the taxpayer or, alternatively, to his son. In its analysis, the Court noted that underlying the 
reasoning in most cases where the taxpayer has been held to have gross income even though he 
never personally received the income:  
Is the thought that income is ‘realized’ by the assignor because he, who owns or 
controls the source of the income, also controls the disposition of that which he could 
have received himself and diverts the payment from himself to others as the means of 
procuring satisfaction of his wants. The taxpayer has equally enjoyed the fruits of his 
labor or investment and obtained the satisfaction of his desires whether he collects and 
uses the income to procure those satisfactions, or whether he disposes of his right to 
collect it as the means of procuring them.  
Id. at 116-17. The Court also determined that “the power to dispose of income is the equivalent 
of ownership of it.” Id. at 118. Additionally, the Court noted that the “dominant purpose of the 
revenue laws is the taxation of income to those who earn or otherwise create the right to receive 
it and enjoy the benefits of it when paid.” Id. at 119. 
 72. In Clarks, the client had no predetermined interest in the case before he assigned away 
a portion of it. Thus, the case lacks the main evil that Lucas and Horst sought to avoid, namely 
the shifting of tax liability to avoid taxation. 202 F.3d 854, 857. As the court noted:  
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then determined that the transaction in Baylin was more like a 
division of property than an assignment of income.73 
D. Srivastava v. Commissioner 
In Srivastava v. Commissioner,74 the Fifth Circuit again weighed 
in on the contingent fee issue. While the decision followed the 
circuit’s precedent in Cotnam, the court also critically examined the 
argument for excluding contingent fees.75 
The court noted that every court considering the issue had 
characterized contingent fees in one of two ways. The first 
characterization, an anticipatory assignment of income,76 provides 
 
In Lucas and Horst, the income assigned to the assignee was already earned, vested 
and relatively certain to be paid to the assignor. It was a gift of accrued income to a 
family member. The assignor’s purpose was to split income with a family member and 
avoid the donor’s higher rate under the progressive income tax . . . Here there was no 
res, no fund, no proceeds, no vested interest, only a hope to receive money from the 
lawyer’s efforts and the client’s right, a right yet to be determined by judge and jury. 
Clarks, as an assignor, had no predetermined interest in any res before entering a 
contingency fee arrangement with his attorney, unlike the taxpayer plaintiffs in Lucas 
and Horst. There was no purpose to shift tax liability among members of a family.  
Id.  
 73. The court states:  
Here the client as assignor has transferred some of the trees in his orchard, not merely 
the fruit from the trees. The lawyer has become a tenant in common of the orchard 
owner and must cultivate and care for and harvest the fruit of the entire tract. Here the 
lawyer’s income is the result of his own personal skill and judgment, not the skill or 
largess of a family member who wants to split his income to avoid taxation. The 
income should be charged to the one who earned it and received it, not as under the 
government’s theory of the case, to one who neither received it nor earned it. The 
situation is no different from the transfer of a one-third interest in real estate that is 
thereafter leased to a tenant.  
202 F.3d 854, 858. 
 74. 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 75. In this somewhat unusual case, the court seems to indicate that it would decide 
contrary to Cotnam if not for the constraints of precedent. For further analysis of this unusual 
approach see Benjamin C. Rasmussen, Note, Taxation of an Attorney’s Contingency Fee of a 
Punitive Damages Recovery: The Srivastava Approach. 15 BYU J. PUB. L. 301 (2000). 
 76. 220 F.3d at 358-59. The court also states:  
In the ordinary case the taxpayer who acquires the right to receive income is taxed 
when he receives it, regardless of the time when his right to receive payment accrued. 
But the rule that income is not taxable until realized has never been taken to mean that 
the taxpayer . . . who has fully enjoyed the benefit of the economic gain represented by 
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that if a taxpayer voluntarily assigns future income to another, it is 
still considered income realized to the taxpayer.77 The second 
characterization follows the idea that when one transfers, sells, or 
otherwise relinquishes an asset or income source to another, the 
anticipatory assignment doctrine does not apply.78 Under the second 
characterization, the contingent fee contract is more like the division 
of a property interest than an assignment of income.79 
The court then observed the difficulty of fitting the contingent fee 
contract into one of these two categories.80 The court stated that the 
anticipatory assignment of income doctrine rests on the idea that as 
long as taxpayers maintain control of their own property, they should 
be liable for the income received therefrom.81 However, in a 
contingent fee situation, the client is neither the sole owner of his 
claim nor completely divested of it.82 The court also contrasted the 
 
his right to receive income, can escape taxation because he has not himself received 
payment of it from his obligor. The rule [of realization], founded on administrative 
convenience, is only one of postponement of the tax to the final event of enjoyment of 
the income, usually the receipt of it by the taxpayer, and not one of exemption from 
taxation where the enjoyment is consummated by some event other than the taxpayer’s 
personal receipt of property. This may occur when he has made such use or disposition 
of his power to receive or control the income as to procure in its place other 
satisfactions that are of economic worth . . . .  
[Under the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine,] income is “realized” by the 
assignor because he, who owns or controls the source of the income, also controls the 
disposition of that which he could have received himself and diverts the payment from 
himself to others as the means of procuring the satisfaction of his wants. The taxpayer 
has equally enjoyed the fruits of his labor or investment and obtained the satisfaction 
of his desires whether he collects and uses the income to procure those satisfactions, or 
whether he disposes of his right to collect it as the means of procuring them.  
Id. at 358-59 (citing Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 115-17). 
 77. Id. 
 78. “On the other hand, the doctrine does not apply to a taxpayer who transfers, sells, or 
otherwise relinquishes an asset or income source to another, because the taxpayer ceases to 
receive any income from that asset.” Id. at 359.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Specifically, the court states, “contingent fee contracts defy easy categorization, 
standing as they do somewhere in between the two poles—on one hand, an obvious scheme to 
evade taxation through diversion of future income streams to another, and on the other hand, 
full and complete divestment of an income source.” Id. at 360. 
 81. Id. The court approvingly cites Helvering: “We have held without deviation that 
where the donor retains control of the trust property the income is taxable to him although paid 
to the donee.” Id. (quoting Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 119 n.20 (1940)). 
 82. Id. 
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gratuitous transfers in Horst and Lucas with an arms length business 
transaction such as a contingent fee contract.83  
Nevertheless, the court pointed out that while the outcome when 
entering into a contingent fee contract is uncertain,84 such uncertainty 
had not precluded the application of the anticipatory assignment of 
income doctrine to other arrangements.85 Further, the court found an 
inherent inconsistency in excluding attorney’s fees via a contingent 
fee contract from a client’s gross income while including attorney’s 
fees via a standard fee contract.86 
After its detailed analysis, the court determined that if it were 
approaching the case as a tabula rasa, it would probably find the 
contingent fee includible in the taxpayers’ gross income.87 The court 
declined to overrule Cotnam,88 however, and refused to distinguish 
the earlier case based on its reliance on Alabama law.89 Instead, the 
court determined that assignment of income analysis looks to the 
taxpayer’s degree of control over the asset, regardless of what state 
law applies.90 
 
 83. Id. at 361. 
 84. Id. at 361-62. 
 85. The court notes:  
But just because a future income stream . . . is of uncertain value does not mean a 
taxpayer cannot achieve gain from anticipatorily assigning it to another. The taxpayer 
in Earl, after all, was taxed on the portion of his future salary anticipatorily assigned to 
his spouse; that there was some degree of inherent uncertainty in his future income 
stream went without comment and did not preclude application of the doctrine. 
Id. at 362.  
 86. Id. 
 87. “Thus, were we to decide this case as an original matter, we might apply the 
anticipatory assignment doctrine to hold that contingent fees are gross income to the client.” Id. 
at 363. 
 88. “We do not, however, decide this case on a clean slate, but must follow the contrary 
approach endorsed in Cotnam.” Id. 
 89. See supra note 40. The Cotnam court rested its decision, in part, on an Alabama law 
giving attorneys a superior lien upon their interest stemming from a contingent fee contract. 
 90. The court noted: 
These distinctions, however, should not affect the analysis required by the anticipatory 
assignment of income doctrine, which looks to the taxpayer’s degree of control and 
dominion over the asset . . . . But we find no assistance from the fact that Alabama 
may offer its contingent fee attorneys, by way of example, greater power to pursue 
relief directly against the opposing party. Whatever are the attorney’s rights against the 
defendant under Texas law as opposed to Alabama law, the discrepancy does not 
meaningfully affect the economic reality facing the taxpayer-plaintiff.  
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E. Young v. Commissioner 
The Fourth Circuit, in Young v. Commissioner,91 identified what, 
in its view, were three important problems with the reasoning in the 
Cotnam line of decisions. First, the court rejected the division of 
property rationale, pointing out that the client still had ultimate 
control over all decision-making aspects of the case.92 Second, the 
court rejected the rationale that the taxpayer’s claim would be 
“worthless without the aid of skillful attorneys.”93 Lastly, it pointed 
out the inherent unfairness in allowing tax avoidance by a simple 
contractual arrangement.94 The choice between a contingency 
arrangement and hourly fees has little bearing on a client’s enjoyment 
of a favorable outcome to the litigation.95 The court therefore refused 
to see why the Code should treat contingent fees differently.96  
F. Foster v. United States 
In Foster v. United States,97 the Eleventh Circuit both upheld a 
contingent fee exclusion based largely on the Cotnam decision98 and 
 
Id. at 363-64. 
 91. 240 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 92. “The client still controls the claim (or property) and ultimately decides to forego, 
pursue, or settle that claim. The attorney simply provides a service and receives compensation 
for that service, whether by an hourly rate or through a contingent fee.” Id. at 378. 
 93. Id. at 377 (quoting Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125). 
 94. The court noted that this would “permit a client to avoid taxation by ‘skillfully 
devis[ing]’ the method for paying her attorneys’ fees, the precise danger the Supreme Court 
warned against in Earl.” Id. 
 95. As support for this view the court cites Srivastava: 
Indeed the Fifth Circuit itself, although following Cotnam on stare decisis, has recently 
recognized that a client with a contingent fee arrangement: “[O]ught not receive 
preferential tax treatment from the simple fortuity that he hired counsel on a contingent 
basis, for his attorney’s method of compensation did not meaningfully affect the gain 
he was able to enjoy from a favorable resolution of the litigation.” 
Id. at 378 (citing Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 363) (alteration in original). 
 96. “We see no reason to let her escape taxation on a portion of the settlement proceeds 
simply because she arranged to compensate her attorneys directly from the proceeds through a 
contingent fee arrangement.” Id. at 377-78. 
 97. 249 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 98. The court based its decision on Cotnam in that, due to the right of Alabama’s 
attorneys, she “did not have the authority to access the money she had assigned to her attorneys 
before the appeal, she did not ‘fully enjoy . . . the benefit of the economic gain represented by 
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extended Cotnam’s exclusion to cover contingent fee contracts 
executed after the original decision but before appeal.99 The court 
reasoned that even after a district court ruling, a taxpayer’s interest is 
still contingent on the results of the appellate process.100 
G. Kenseth v. Commissioner 
In Kenseth v. Commissioner,101 the Seventh Circuit took issue 
with the Cotnam line of cases. The court noted that while several 
states have laws similar to those cited by the court in Cotnam,102 such 
laws do not give the attorney an ownership interest in the actual 
claim. In fact, under Wisconsin law,103 attorneys are barred from 
obtaining an ownership interest in their client’s claim.104 Instead of 
adopting the division of property theory, the Seventh Circuit 
classified the contingent fee attorney’s interest as a security 
interest.105 The court then distinguished contingent fee contracts from 
proprietary interests by noting that the former do not give the 
attorney control over the claim.106 The court ended its analysis by 
determining that the contingent fee contract is merely an assignment 
 
[her] right to receive income,’ as did the father in Horst who gave the gift to his son.” Id. at 
1279 (citing Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940)) (alteration in original). 
 99. “Foster argues that the 50% of her post-judgment interest that was paid to her 
attorneys as the result of the pre-appeal agreement should be controlled by Cotnam, even 
though the agreement was signed after the jury had returned a verdict in her favor. We agree.” 
Id. at 1280. 
 100. “Before the appeals process, there was no guarantee that Foster would ultimately 
receive the amount awarded by the jury. In fact, during the appeals process, the final judgment 
number was altered various times, and the ultimate number we address today is lower than the 
jury verdict.” Id. 
 101. 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 102. Id. at 883. 
 103. Id. “Wisconsin now . . . prohibits lawyers from acquiring ‘a proprietary interest in the 
cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client.’. . . The rule 
allows the lawyer to acquire a lien and to make a contingent-fee contract, but neither a lien or a 
contractual right is ‘proprietary.’” Id. at 883-84 (citing Wisconsin State Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Supreme Court Rule 20:1.8(j)) (citation omitted). 
 104. “[T]he plaintiff concedes, as again he must, that Wisconsin law does not make the 
contingent-fee lawyer a joint owner of his client’s claim in the legal sense any more than the 
commission salesman is a joint owner of his employer’s accounts receivable.” 259 F.3d at 883. 
 105. “The lawyer has a lien, that is, a security interest. But the ownership of a security 
interest is not ownership of the security.” Id.  
 106. Id. at 884. 
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of a portion of the taxpayer’s income.107 The court therefore 
determined that the contingent fee should be included in the client’s 
gross income. 
III. ANALYSIS 
As previously noted, the contingent fee issue divides the Circuit 
Courts of Appeals into two groups. The first group generally holds 
that it is proper to exclude an attorney’s contingent fee from his 
client’s gross income based on the theory that the contingent fee is 
not income transferred to the attorney, but rather the attorney’s 
assumption of a portion of the client’s claim. The second group holds 
that a contingent fee merely represents an alternative form of 
payment and that, under Old Colony Trust v. Commissioner,108 the 
money received by the attorney is payment for services rendered.109 
Therefore, the entire portion of the client’s award or settlement is 
included in his gross income less any deductions or exclusions 
allowed under the Code. 
A. It’s a Property Issue—The Cotnam Reasoning 
The courts that argue for the exclusion of contingent fees from 
gross income generally do so under two entirely separate lines of 
reasoning. The first line of reasoning asserts that the host state’s 
statutes, or the common law regarding attorney’s liens, creates a 
special relationship that is substantively different from other 
creditor’s liens. This lien, they argue, effectively creates a right of 
joint ownership between attorney and client upon entering into a 
 
 107. The court notes: 
In essence, Kenseth wants us to recharacterize this as a case in which he assigned 40 
percent of his tort claim to the law firm. But he didn’t. A contingent-fee contract is not 
an assignment . . . and in Wisconsin, the lawyer is prohibited from acquiring 
ownership of his client’s claim. So what Kenseth is really asking us to do is to assign a 
portion of his income to the law firm, but of course an assignment of income (as 
distinct from the assignment of a contract or an asset that generates income) by a 
taxpayer is ineffective to shift his tax liability. 
Id. 
 108. 279 U.S. 716 (1929). 
 109. Id. at 729. 
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contingent fee contract.  
In Cotnam, the court cited one of its previous decisions, where it 
had likened a state attorney’s lien law to creating “a charge ‘in the 
nature of an equitable assignment . . . (or) equitable lien’ in the cause 
of action.”110 Under this analogy, the court ruled that the attorney’s 
lien operates as an assignment of a percentage of the client’s claim to 
his attorney. Thus, the Cotnam court relied primarily upon a unique 
characterization of Alabama’s attorney’s lien law in order to 
characterize a contingent fee contract as a property contract.111  
After Cotnam, the Sixth Circuit handed down a similar decision 
based on Michigan law in Estate of Clarks.112 The Clarks court 
followed Cotnam by resting its decision, in part, on the theory that 
the state’s common law lien was of a special character that allowed it 
to be more like an assignment of property.113 Thus, upon its 
examination of Michigan’s common law attorney’s lien, the Sixth 
Circuit determined that the lien “operates in more or less the same 
way as the Alabama lien in Cotnam.”114  
This view that the attorney’s lien law transfers a portion of the 
client’s property right in his claim to his attorneys leads one to the 
obvious question of whether the attorney truly has a property-like 
right to the claim. Clearly, the answer is no. One of the chief 
characteristics of property ownership is the concept of control. A 
contingent fee contract, however, gives the attorney no more control 
over the disposition of the client’s claim than any other creditor. The 
attorney can shape and direct the course of the claim, but only within 
the bounds of authority given to him by the client. In other words, the 
 
 110. Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119, 125 (5th Cir. 1959) (citing United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Levy, 77 F.2d 972, 975 (5th Cir. 1935)). 
 111. For an argument in favor of this analysis, see Thad Austin Davis, Cotnam v. 
Commissioner and the Income Tax Treatment of Contingency-Based Attorneys’ Fees—The 
Alabama Attorney’s Charging Lien Meets Lucas v. Earl Head-On, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1683 
(2000). 
 112.  202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 113. In support of this theory, the court cites Ray Andrews Brown’s book, The Law of 
Personal Property, stating that the common law attorney’s lien is “a peculiar lien, to be 
enforced by peculiar methods.” 202 F.3d at 856 (quoting RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF 
PERSONAL PROPERTY § 116 (2d ed. 1955) (citations omitted). Somewhat paradoxically, the 
same passage admits that the lien “may exist although the attorney has not and cannot, in any 
proper senses, have possession of the judgment recovered.” Id.  
 114. Id. 
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client maintains final control over the disposition of his claim. Only 
the client has the authority to bring or relinquish the claim. This 
remains true even if the client assigns a very high percentage of the 
final judgment to his attorney. Under a contingent fee contract, the 
attorney does not actually receive a portion of the claim itself. 
Instead, the attorney receives a charge against the client’s future 
recovery in compensation for the attorney’s services in prosecuting 
the client’s claim. 
The other line of reasoning that courts employ to exclude 
contingent attorney’s fees is to distinguish the contingent fee from an 
anticipatory assignment of income. Courts assert that a contingent fee 
is more like a division of property between an attorney and client. In 
Estate of Clarks, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that, given the 
speculative nature of a client’s claim, a contingent fee contract is 
essentially a joint venture between attorney and client from which 
they benefit according to the portions of the claim allotted to each by 
the contract.115 The court, attempting to distinguish the tree and fruit 
analogy put forth in Horst,116 likened a contingent fee contract to the 
client “transferr[ing] some of the trees in his orchard, not merely the 
fruit from the trees. The lawyer has become a tenant in common of 
the orchard owner and must cultivate and care for and harvest the 
fruit of the entire tract.”117  
In Srivastava, the Fifth Circuit, while not completely comfortable 
with all of the implications of the tree and fruit rationale, noted that 
“when a client hires an attorney to prosecute a claim on his behalf, 
control over that claim—the income source or ‘tree’—is neither fully 
 
 115. The court states: 
Like an interest in a partnership agreement or joint venture, Clarks contracted for 
services and assigned his lawyer a one-third interest in the venture in order that he 
might have a chance to recover the remaining two-thirds. Just as in Cotnam, the 
assignment Clarks’ lawyer received operated as a lien on a portion of the judgment 
sought to be recovered transferring ownership of that portion of the judgment to the 
attorney. 
Id. at 857. 
 116. In Horst, the court likened the taxpayer’s property to a tree bearing fruit. The right to 
receive income from the property is the fruit. Accordingly, it is the ownership of the tree that 
determines the proper taxpayer. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 120 (1940). 
 117. 202 F.3d at 858. 
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divested to the attorney nor fully retained by the taxpayer-client.”118 
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit ruled that, given the prior controlling 
precedent set forth in Cotnam, the exclusion was permissible because 
the attorney’s contingent fee amounts to the realization of his portion 
of the claim. This “joint venture” analysis has provided the only 
influential, strictly analytical policy base119 for excluding an 
attorney’s contingent fee from the client’s income. 
Because this line of reasoning is strikingly similar to the 
attorney’s lien reasoning, it falls prey to the same types of problems. 
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that an attorney’s income under a 
contingent fee contract depends on his own skill and effort as well as 
the underlying claim provided by his client.120 In Horst, the Supreme 
Court stated that the “dominant purpose of the revenue laws is the 
taxation of income to those who earn or otherwise create the right to 
receive it and enjoy the benefit of it when paid.”121 The Supreme 
Court’s statement demonstrates that both the attorney and the client 
qualify for taxation under the Sixth Circuit’s definition of a 
contingent fee contract. Under the reasoning set forth in Estate of 
Clarks, the client is responsible for creating the right to receive 
income, and the attorney is, in effect, the party credited with having 
“earned” this right. The rationale for this treatment is that while the 
client ultimately controls the underlying claim, that claim is 
essentially worthless without the efforts of the attorney. Therefore, 
both the client and attorney should be credited for having earned and 
created the right to receive income. 
While initially appealing, this characterization of the right to 
 
 118. Srivastava v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 353, 360 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 119. Recently, an alternative characterization has been suggested, that of the relation 
between the sharecropper and landowner. See Kenseth v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 399, 421-58 
(2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting). This characterization eliminates the issue of who owns the 
client’s claim (in a sharecropping situation, the landowner maintains ownership of the land) and 
seems to offer a more equitable solution (under the Code, the sharecropper’s share of income 
from the crop is treated as income and the landowner’s portion is treated as rental income on the 
property). However, this analogy is flawed. In a sharecropping situation, the sharecropper 
actually owns the crop as well as his own labor. Conversely, the attorney in a contingent fee 
arrangement has no property interest in the “crop” (the action started on the claim). The 
attorney merely has an interest in the labor that he or she has provided up until to the point in 
question. 
 120. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 858. 
 121. 311 U.S. 112, 119 (1940).  
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receive income may be so expansive that its adoption could alter the 
entire tax code. There is no doubt that a client’s claim has no exact 
discernable value. Further, one cannot doubt that an attorney’s efforts 
in prosecuting his client’s claim can help to shape and grow the value 
of that claim. Yet it is questionable whether this situation is unique to 
the contingent fee contract. It seems that this aspect of the attorney-
client relationship exists in many everyday business relationships.122 
Individuals often enlist the aid of knowledgeable experts in order to 
increase the value of the property they own. Usually, these experts 
are compensated at a flat rate. However, if the experts receive a 
percentage of the profit derived from the property, the tax code treats 
that profit as having been earned by the property owner. Further, a 
client’s claim can have a more definite value than many speculative 
 
 122. For example, imagine that an individual owns an estate for five years in a piece of 
property that contains a supermarket. The individual soon realizes that the property is situated 
near an affluent residential area that has the need for an organic foods store.  However, the 
owner is unacquainted with the organic foods business and does not know how to begin the 
enterprise. He therefore locates a business manager who specializes in setting up organic foods 
stores. While the manager would accept a flat rate for his services, the owner has inadequate 
funds. The owner further realizes that the manager is a man of exceptional skill and may require 
a very large fee for his services. Accordingly, the owner offers the manager forty percent of all 
profits from the store during the five years he owns it if the manager agrees to set up the store. 
The owner, however, retains the right to override any decisions the manager makes. Further, the 
manager must consult with and obtain the permission of the owner before making any major 
decisions. However, the owner, realizing that the manager’s business judgment is probably 
better than his own, gives the manager complete day-to-day control of the store. The owner also 
retains the right to terminate the business at any time, for any reason, provided that he 
compensates the manager for the work already completed.  
 Five years pass and the store has grossed over $5 million. Under the reasoning set forth in 
Clarks, one could easily conclude that the owner’s property was of indiscernible value. While 
there was a good chance that the store would profit, it could not have done so without the 
manager’s expert advice and planning. It seems quite a stretch, however, to say that the $2 
million income received by the manager as compensation for his services was not first received 
by the owner. Certainly, the owner received the benefit of the manager’s efforts. If the owner 
had agreed to pay the manager a flat fee of $2 million, the entire $5 million earned by the store 
would be treated as earned income to the owner. Further, while the owner gave up much in the 
way of everyday control to the manager, the client surrendered much control to the attorney. 
Thus, the owner still retained ultimate control over the store, just as a client retains ultimate 
control over his claim. The only difference between the owner-manager and client-attorney 
scenarios is that the value of the client’s claim may be somewhat more speculative than the 
value of the owner’s store. This is because the store and the land on which it sits constitute real 
property. This need not be the case, however, as in some situations a client’s claim may have a 
discernible value even given the uncertainty of the legal system. Therefore, it is important to 
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business ventures. In many such instances, an attorney’s actions in 
prosecuting a client’s claim is more like “cashing in” the claim than 
laboring to create income. 
B. It is a Property Issue . . . The Client’s Property 
A majority of the Circuit Courts of Appeals have ruled that the 
entire portion of a client’s settlement or award should be included in 
his gross income.123 For most of the circuits, this decision comes with 
very little analysis. Generally, the courts first address the fact that the 
majority of courts that have decided to exclude contingent fees from 
a client’s gross income have done so on the theory that the local 
attorney’s lien law gives the attorney something approximating an 
actual property interest in the claim. Then, noting that the governing 
jurisdiction has no such lien,124 the courts proceed to a 
characterization analysis. Any such analysis begins with the 
definition of gross income set out by Congress in the Code, noting 
that one’s gross income includes all income except for those items 
explicitly excluded by the Code.  
With this presumption, the courts make several notable 
conclusions. First, because most attorneys are ethically precluded 
from obtaining an ownership interest in their client’s claim, whatever 
interest an attorney has is not one that conveys even partial 
ownership over the claim.125 Further, even if the attorneys have a 
very strong lien, still, a lien, by definition, is merely the right to 
receive payment of a debt, not a property interest in the claim 
 
 123. There is currently an eight to three split among the circuits. 
 124. While the courts note that the states of their respective jurisdictions have liens, they 
determine that these are not of the quality to transfer ownership of the claim to the attorney. 
See, e.g., Benci-Woodward v. Commissioner, 219 F.3d 941, 943, stating:  
[T]he conclusion emerges that in litigation an attorney conducts for a client he acquires 
no more than a professional interest. To hold that a contingent fee contract or any 
“assignment” or “lien” created thereby gives the attorney the beneficial rights of a real 
party in interest, with the concomitant personal responsibility of financing the 
litigation, would be to demean his profession and distort the purpose of the various 
acceptable methods of securing his fee.  
Id. (quoting Isrin v. Superior Court, 403 P.2d 728, 733 (Cal. 1965)). See also Kenseth, 259 F.3d 
at 883; Young, 240 F.3d at 379. 
 125. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(i) (2002). 
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itself.126 Second, the exclusion of the contingent fee from a client’s 
gross income would lead to disparate treatment of attorney’s fees 
based on the client’s choice of hourly or contingent fee payment. 
Third, the client receives the benefit of the attorney’s efforts via the 
contingent fee contract. Finally, the courts generally have rejected 
any argument that the Code places an undue burden on parties that 
choose to prosecute their claims by entering into contingent fees. The 
Code discriminates among taxpayers based on artificial statutory 
definitions that the courts have no authority to override.127  
Accordingly, the majority of these courts hold that despite the 
supposed burden imposed on taxpayers, an award or settlement on a 
client’s claim is still income to the client. The mere fact that the client 
has contracted away a portion of his settlement or award to his 
attorney as payment does not change the fact that the contingent fee 
amounts to an assignment of future income as payment to the 
attorney for services rendered on the client’s behalf. 
While the courts ruling that contingent fees should be included in 
the client’s gross income are correct in determining that the client-
attorney relationship under a contingent fee contract is not closely 
analogous to a joint venture or joint ownership in the claim, neither 
does it conform with normal assignment of income doctrine 
standards. Attempting to fit the contingent fee under the assignment 
of income doctrine creates several difficulties. First, unlike many 
early cases decided under this doctrine, the motivation behind the 
contingent fee contract is not tax avoidance. Second, while the 
doctrine has been applied in the past to future income assigned to 
another by the property owner when that income is speculative in 
 
 126. Black’s Law Dictionary defines an attorney’s lien as, “the right of an attorney to hold 
or retain a client’s money or property (a retaining lien) or to encumber money payable to the 
client and possessed by the court (a charging lien) until the attorney’s fees have been paid.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 933 (7th Ed. 1999). 
 127. See Kenseth, stating that the courts should avoid judicially eliminating inequities in 
the tax code:  
Especially when the means suggested for eliminating one inequity (that which Kenseth 
argues is created by the alternative minimum income tax) consists of creating another 
inequity (differential treatment for purposes of that tax of fixed and contingent legal 
fees). And if it were a feasible judicial undertaking, it still would not be a proper one, 
equity in taxation being a political rather than a jural concept. 
259 F.3d 881, 885. 
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nature, the contingent fee provides a situation where the future 
income is not only speculative but alterable through the efforts of the 
assignee. The question remains, however, whether these differences 
necessarily negate a traditional assignment of income analysis.  
Courts that exclude an attorney’s contingent fee from his client’s 
gross income correctly note that an underlying theme of Horst and 
Earl is the attempt to ensure that income is taxed to the individual for 
whom the income is intended, and that one cannot escape proper 
taxation by assigning future streams of income to others. Were this 
the basis for the decisions in the above two cases the exclusionary 
courts would have a strong case. But the Supreme Court did not rely 
on the taxpayer’s attempt to circumvent proper taxation as the reason 
for applying the assignment of income doctrine in either case. If it 
had, the “tree and fruit” analogy outlined in Earl128 would not be an 
exception to the rule, for when a taxpayer assigns away income 
producing property to another, he or she may do so with the 
motivation to escape taxation. However, the income from that 
transferred property will not be charged to the taxpayer, even though 
his motivation was tax avoidance. The reason for this is that the 
obligations put in place by the Code stem not from the ownership of a 
stream of income but from ownership of the property that creates the 
right to receive that income. Section 61(a) of the Code provides that 
“gross income means all income from whatever source derived.”129 
Therefore, if one owns a piece of income-producing property, the 
income derived from that property is included in the gross income of 
the property owner. Similarly, if one is paid for services rendered, 
then this compensation is taxable to the renderer as de facto owner of 
his ability to perform labor.  
Once the derivation-based theory laid out in Horst and Earl is 
understood, the other objections to applying the assignment of 
income doctrine to contingent fees are considerably lessened. A 
contingent fee contract is unlike a situation where one individual 
detaches interest coupons from a bond and gives them to another in 
order to avoid taxation on that interest. One obvious difference is that 
the interest coupons have a readily discernible value. Characterizing 
 
 128. 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930). 
 
 129. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1994) (emphasis added). 
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them as income to the bond owner thus assures that the owner does 
not escape proper tax treatment under our progressive rate schedule 
by assigning away streams of income and obtaining a lower tax 
bracket. However, income that is realized from a speculative, 
contingent right is still derived from that right, and that right is 
owned and controlled by the client. It is therefore the ownership of 
the right that is dispositive and not the fact that the income is easily 
discernible. 
IV. PROPOSAL 
The only treatment of contingent fees that maintains the present 
principles of the Code is their inclusion in the client’s gross income. 
Excluding contingent fees would carve out an artificial judicial 
exception to statutory requirements, which are clearly delineated in 
the Code, and are interpreted by the Supreme Court in a line of cases 
spanning more than seventy years. While the inclusion of contingent 
fees in gross income may seem unfair to some, remedying the 
situation is a job for Congress, not the judiciary. There are several 
avenues Congress could take to eliminate this inequity, but the easiest 
method would be to allow deductions for the production of income 
under the AMT.130 Not only would this method remedy the problem 
while respecting the structure of the Code, but it would establish 
parallel treatment of contingent fees under both the AMT and the 
traditional tax structure.131 Further, it would conform with the AMT’s 
purpose of ensuring that high-income individuals do not escape tax 
liability by the advantageous use of allowable deductions. 
There are reasons why Congress may wish to sanction the 
exclusion of contingent fees from gross income. Chief among them is 
 
 130. Other possible solutions include amending the Code to make all attorney’s fees 
deductible, making contingent attorney’s fees deductible, excluding all attorney’s fees or just 
contingent attorney’s fees from gross income, and eliminating the AMT altogether. However, 
all of these suggestions would act contrary to previous congressional actions to limit such 
deductions for being too broad. 
 131. Note that under the current standard tax code, section 162 deductions are allowed to 
the amount that they exceed two percent of the taxpayer’s gross income. I.R.C. § 67(a) (1994). 
By allowing attorney’s fees used for the production of income to be deducted under the AMT, 
the fees would receive similar treatment under both systems, thus maintaining the AMT’s 
general purpose of ensuring proper tax treatment of high income individuals. 
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that the contingent fee contract is the only avenue for many lower-
income individuals to obtain legal counsel. If the availability of legal 
counsel to low-income individuals truly depends on a different 
characterization of the contingent fee, Congress is warranted in 
taking action. 
CONCLUSION 
The treatment of attorney’s fees under the Code has created a 
large burden on clients who enter into contingent fee contracts with 
their attorneys to initiate prosecution of their claims. Under current 
tax law, this burden amounts, in some instances, to a client being left 
with a very small portion of his award after paying attorney’s fees 
and taxes. This inequity has caused a rash of litigation attempting to 
exclude contingent fees altogether from a client’s gross income by 
characterizing the fee as the attorney’s property interest in the client’s 
claim. This characterization does not follow the standards developed 
by the judiciary in interpreting the Code. In reality, the client owns 
the entire claim; it is the client’s property. While an attorney may 
have significant control over the prosecution of the claim, the claim is 
still the property of the client. The contingent fee contract simply 
provides a device by which the client pays for the attorney’s labor 
with a portion of the client’s future recovery. The client receives the 
benefit of the attorney’s services and, therefore, the income 
represented by those services. To rule otherwise would be to create 
an artificial judicial exception to the statutory rules set forth by 
Congress in the Code. 
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